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Abstract. The need is growing for a workforce with both technical skills and 
the ability to navigate existing and emerging information security challenges. 
Practitioners can no longer depend upon process-driven approaches to people, 
processes and IT systems to manage information security. They need to be 
navigators of the entire environment to effectively integrate controls to protect 
information and technology. The research presented in this paper trialed an 
innovative tactile learning activity developed through the European 
Technology-supported Risk Estimation by Predictive Assessment of Socio-
technical Security (TREsPASS) project with tertiary education students, 
designed to provide students with experience in real-world modelling of 
complex information security scenarios. The outcomes demonstrate that 
constructing such models in an educational setting are a means of encouraging 
exploration of the multiple dimensions of security. Such teaching may be a 
means of teaching social, organization and technical navigation skills necessary 
to integrate security controls in complex settings.  
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1   Introduction 
Information security uses processes, tools and techniques to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and information systems. 
Current information security practice in organizations is carried out through the 
assessing of risk and performing of risk treatments, the creation of policy and the 
demonstration of compliance, planning, incident management, and business 
continuity. Through these actions, the practice of information security management is 
presented as a systematic approach to the protection of information, and includes 
people, processes and IT systems. 
In government policy [1, 2], information security is promoted as an important 
means with which to protect an organization’s activities and information (assets) upon 
which an organization relies to undertake day-to-day business. Protection from 
disrupted business operations, theft of sensitive or valuable information, and 
reputational damage are important. In the security management discourse there are 
many examples of the impacts of information breaches [3]. For example, the loss of 
availability of an IT system for a bank may impact the organisation financially; the 
exposure of personal health information may breach confidentiality and impact an 
individual’s privacy; and intentional manipulation of student grades challenges the 
integrity of results.  
At the forefront of bringing security know-how into organizations and helping 
organizations defend against information breaches is the information security 
professional, often termed “security practitioner”. There are many types of security 
practitioner but broadly speaking a security practitioner helps an organisation to 
identify and manage its risk from data breaches and attacks on technological systems 
[4]. Such security professional roles include: IT Security Officer, Information 
Security System Manager, Information Security System Officer, and Security & 
Information Risk Advisor [5]. As such, an information security practitioner sits at the 
intersection between business, technology and regulation. An information security 
practitioner must also be able to communicate across an organisation with individuals 
and groups from different educational, professional and social backgrounds.  
This paper explores the changing role of information security professionals, 
security practitioner skills, and conceptualization of security roles, and discusses what 
is needed in education to respond to these changes. Increasingly, security practitioners 
are required not only to ensure the protection of technology and information but also 
to integrate this protection into the wider organizational setting. Such integration 
requires skills that enable security practitioners to engage with, travel through and 
bring together the social, economic, political, cultural as well as technical aspects of 
an organization. This requires building a skill set that sees the security practitioner 
become both an individual that not only design and deploy information security 
controls and protection but can also navigate an organization by making sense of the 
different aspects of an organizational setting, understand the connections between 
those aspects and communicate the importance of those connections.  
In this paper, a re-positioning of the security practitioner as such a navigator of the 
organization is explored and a navigation visual modelling tool activity trialed. In 
particular, the work of November et al [6] influences this perspective. In this paper, 
we reflect on the outputs of a mapping exercise to consider how information security 
practitioners can construct and use a map of the organizational landscape in order to 
navigate an organization through risky territory. Whilst the security practitioner is 
often characterized as a facilitator (e.g. [7]) and technology tools are available that 
describe the processes of identification and management of risk as navigation (e.g. 
[8]) the navigation role of the security practitioner is less well considered in the 
information security practice literature.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Section 2 information security practice 
as a profession is discussed, outlining the current skills matrix from the professional 
bodies, the role of tertiary education and the contribution of November et al [6] to the 
discussion of navigation as practice and how this conceptualization might prompt a 
new way of looking at the skills matrix. Section 3 presents the design of a case study 
that examines how a mapping exercise might contribute to the teaching of the role of 
navigator.  In Section 4 the study results are presented. The discussion in Section 5 
includes reflections from the students and facilitators as to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the navigation approach. This is followed in Section 6 with the 
conclusion. 
2   The Profession of an Information Security Practitioner 
Information security has a long and varied history and its evolution shows how 
information security is an umbrella term for many types of information protection [9]. 
With the advent of computing, information security became a field of study [10] and 
as the uptake of computing spread, the field of study has become more diverse. As 
organizations have become increasingly dependent on computerized production, 
circulation, protection and curation of information, information security as a 
recognized professional practice has also emerged and diversified [11]. 
2.1   Security Practitioner Skills 
Whilst there exist international standards, for instance the ISO/IEC 27000 - 
Information Security Management family of standards [12], and other information 
security frameworks and guidelines to assess and treat the risks [13], security 
practitioners must have a range of skills in the processes, tools and techniques of 
information security. The standards for the management of security [12] emphasize 
that security practitioners must also have the skills to understand the social, 
organizational and political context in which these are applied. The traditional 
methods for managing information security rely on controls of distinct types including 
those at the administrative or bureaucratic layer of an organization, logical and 
physical controls within computer systems and architectures, classification of 
information and information protection techniques such as encryption. These controls 
are implemented and managed through organizational processes such as governance 
and assurance, incident response, and business continuity. Within information 
security practice, there is increased recognition of sociotechnical challenges brought 
about through ubiquitous computing, big data analytics [14] and the persistent 
collection of data from the Internet of everything [15]. These sociotechnical 
challenges can, in one sense, be described as the interactions between the social, 
organizational and the technical facets. 
This awareness of the sociotechnical challenge requires new perspectives on 
understanding the attack methods, attack phases, continuous monitoring, rapid attack 
detection as well as the mitigations that are required [14]. The new perspectives that 
integrate the social and the organizational into what has historically been primarily 
technical and mathematical thinking require us to rethink our approach to managing 
information security. In this paper we suggest that one way to reconceptualize 
security practitioners is to frame practitioners as navigators who chart the 
organizational landscape anticipating information security harms and plotting a safe 
and secure course in light of these harms rather than people who simply ‘do’ 
information security. As a navigator, security practitioners may oversee the 
development of policies, the performance of risk assessments and treatments and the 
design and implementation of security controls. However, their primary role is to help 
the organization to find a way through the complex and knotty challenges by helping 
the organization to understand the risk signposts, identify and understand the security 
relationships between different aspects of the organization, reflect on the potential for 
information security hazards as the organisation undertakes its activities, and both 
communicate and collaborate with other members of the organisation to respond to 
the anticipated risks along the way.  
In this reframing, the role of information security education therefore becomes as 
much about teaching and nurturing navigation skills as it does teaching information 
security engineering skills. Navigational skills also require an understanding of the 
broader theoretical concepts of security and the connections between individual, 
organizational, societal, economic, political and technical securities to understand the 
complexity of the landscape security practitioners are charting. For example, as the 
study by Shedden et al [16] illustrates there are significant limitations with current 
risk assessment methodologies resulting from a lack of recognition of the social and 
knowledge aspects of organizational processes which are integral to the environment 
to be protected. It is therefore imperative that we move beyond the teaching of the 
traditional risk and asset-protection approach to security practice and, instead, teach 
security concepts, techniques and theories that can be assembled in limitless ways in 
real-world environments. Such an education will then enable security practitioners 
who use their knowledge to read and interpret risk cues and signposts as they navigate 
an organisation through the complex cyber security environment to meet their 
business goals and organizational governance requirements. 
2.2 Navigating the Risk Landscape 
November et al [6] discuss the role of the map in exploring risk landscapes, and 
eloquently describe using digital technologies both to map terrains and to interact 
with digital maps in a way that was not possible in the pre-digital age. This interaction 
enables a community to use the map as a means of navigation and to bring into a 
single picture both the physical, social, political and human geographical dimensions. 
The authors argue that such digital mapping techniques liberate the mapping process 
from being tied to transcribing the physical space as the base of the map and enable 
the navigator to foreground different perspectives of a space. Digital techniques and 
technologies, examples of which can be found in [47], enable an individual to map 
routes through the socio-physical space using a series of risk signposts and building 
an understanding of the relationship between those signposts. Navigating in this way 
requires skills to reflect, identify and resolve conflict and to both wrestle with and 
form a position on ambiguous risk cues that emerge in organizational settings. In this 
paper, we argue that information security practitioners too have taken on this role of 
navigator and in so doing must also foreground skills for reflection, conflict 
management and the resolution of ambiguity. This paper examines one of the 
techniques that tertiary education in information security might adopt to achieve this.   
2.3 Tertiary Education and Cyber Security 
In recent years, tertiary education has embraced the teaching of information security. 
Indeed, governments around the world have encouraged the establishment of new 
information security courses with a view to increasing national capabilities in 
information security. The perceived value of information security has been heightened 
by the shift in framing from information security to cyber security – where the 
technological aspects of information security are complemented with a political 
dimension [17]. As part of this shift, a cyber security skills shortage narrative emerges 
and tertiary education globally has responded to this narrative with a rise in 
information security courses, often branded as cyber security courses. Cyber security 
skills shortage has been defined [18] as difficulty to identify and retain appropriately 
skilled staff for cyber security related roles. Much of the content of such courses 
therefore focuses on what are regarded as the appropriate skills, namely the technical 
skills needed to implement secure computers and secure networks. Students enroll on 
such courses with the promise of future employment. For example, the UK’s National 
Audit Office published a report [19] on the cyber skills shortage in which it estimated 
that it would take 20 years for the UK to close the cyber security skills gap. This 
position is reinforced by the ISC2 report [20] that suggests that the difference between 
the demand driven projection for cyber security workers and the supply constrained 
projection will be about 1.5 million people globally by 2019. However, the skills gap 
is largely perceived as an engineering one and whilst there is some focus on 
governance and assurance skills, these skills are understood through the prism of 
technology.  
In an attempt to refine and differentiate the skills needed for Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) and security, the cyber security industry is 
directing its attention to developing a skills matrix. For instance, the Skills 
Framework for the Information Age (SFIA) [21] is an ICT skills and capabilities 
matrix, designed to align skills with job roles and responsibilities. The framework is 
careful to distinguish between technical knowledge and professional skills, and maps 
these skills to seven specific levels of attainment for specific job roles. These levels 
reflect the amount of autonomy and responsibility expected in each role and consist 
of: 1-Follow, 2-Assist, 3-Apply, 4-Enable, 5-Ensure and advise, 6-Initiate and 
influence, and 7-Set strategy, inspire and mobilize.  The upper levels, similar to the 
construction of Blooms Taxonomy for education [22], reflect skills that require 
industry application such as ‘influence’. An essential element of the framework is the 
experience and qualification, where experience gives practical demonstration of 
application and consequently capability [21]. Higher education is attempting to embed 
the practical interpretation of higher-level skills into the curriculum and produce 
graduates who are job-ready [23, 24]. This is the behest of both the cyber security 
industry and the students themselves [25] and poses a significant challenge for higher 
education in how to achieve this [26].  
At the same time, the SFIA framework is used by accreditation and professional 
bodies worldwide to ensure a shared understanding and commonality of language 
across industry for defining for IT based and associated jobs, the roles and 
responsibility skills, including those applicable to security. Interestingly, all security 
related skills are listed at SFIA level 3 and above. Information security skills are 
levels 3 to 6, information assurance skills at levels 5 to 7, and security administration 
at levels 3 to 6. This indicates that mere rote learning and understanding of skills is 
not sufficient. University degrees help students develop generic higher-level skills yet 
“many struggle in the labour market”, “University IT graduates are not well matched 
with workplace needs”, and “In IT, universities are not supplying the graduates 
needed by a fast-moving industry” [25].  
Frameworks such as SFIA have been used internationally to map specific skills to 
job roles. For example, the Australian Computer Society [27] identified the skills 
required for twenty-five common ICT roles. This included an ICT Security Specialist 
for which 61 different skills are needed with skill levels predominantly at SFIA level 
5 and above. Other roles across the ICT spectrum were also identified as requiring 
security skills, such as the role of Network Administrator. When broadening the skill 
base to include IT governance, of which security is a component, the number of 
higher level roles with associated high-level skills (SFIA 7) demanding these skills 
expands rapidly.   
Similarly, in the UK, CESG/National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) [5] has 
mapped SFIA and the Institute of Information Security Professionals (IISP). For roles, 
such as Security and Information Risk Advisor, IT Security Officer, and 
Communications Security Officer, CESG/NCSC defines three levels of role aligned to 
SFIA level 2, 4 and 6. This acknowledges that in some roles entry level abilities can 
be catered for in roles that assist in application and monitoring of policy [5]. Such a 
skills matrix highlights the need for practical application and understanding of the 
environment holistically, to enable risk management, policy development and 
conformance, as well as technical skills. Indeed, technical skills themselves are rarely 
mentioned.  
Despite the mapping attempts and skills frameworks, there is still a shortage of 
appropriately skilled graduates particularly in cyber security. This is due, in part, to 
the demand for experience (usually five years) in advertised cyber security positions, 
and a lack of clarity about the skills needed for roles in cyber security [48]. This 
creates a disconnect between the labour market and the job market, particularly where 
graduates are concerned. This problem is exacerbated by a lack of recognition of the 
need for cyber security capability in many organizations, and it is argued that this 
situation will become critical in the future as organizations realize the need for 
specialized cyber security capacity [48].  
When looking at the governance and information assurance tracks of tertiary 
education programs in cyber security, it quickly becomes apparent that risk thinking, 
risk assessment and risk modelling are regarded as significant tracks of the education 
program [4]. Education in this area focuses on the ‘doing’ of risk assessment and risk 
modelling and there is a distinct focus on the protection of information and 
technological assets and how to achieve this. Within such education programs there is 
less focus on organizational knowledge, understanding and how information and 
technological protection interacts with and is shaped by the organizational landscape 
through which the information flows and in which it is produced. Consequently, our 
current methods of teaching information security rarely capture this broader 
perspective, yet it is necessary to be able to understand and apply tools and techniques 
to the way organizations are experienced and understood [16].  
Over the last decade, several voices have articulated the need for change in the 
education program of information security. For example, there is a view that 
“academic programs exposing the students to theoretical concepts and problem-
solving experience are critical for preparing graduates for jobs in information 
security” [28]. Equally there is also the view that meeting the requirements for 
today’s information security practitioner, means certifications that focus on vocational 
training based on core competencies that potentially limit the ability of the student to 
expand their knowledge base.  The difference in tertiary education is that it seeks to 
elicit broad educational objectives with discipline specific knowledge and academic 
abstraction [29]. However, whilst voices have acknowledged the need for change in 
direction in information security education since the turn of the century, the skills gap 
is still perceived as a largely engineering and technical one and does not include the 
skills traditionally found in tertiary education that would support the development of a 
security practitioner as navigator.  
A contributing factor to this stalemate in curriculum development is that of the 
traditional training and certification methods used by the cyber security industry to 
date. Professional and vendor specific certifications have been popular over the past 
10 years. However, in a rapidly expanding and increasingly complex cyber security 
environment such certifications do not prepare graduates to be sufficiently adaptable. 
This issue is not new but yet persists. Further, to be at the leading edge of information 
security protection, education in the field requires innovation and research. Whilst 
certifications can provide knowledge in the short term, by definition, their content 
needs renewal periodically and in the cyber security environment this renders 
knowledge out of date quickly. 
2.4 Security Practitioners as Navigators 
The University of Queensland and the Australian Information Security Association 
(AISA) collaborated with the UK’s Research Institute in the Science of Cyber 
Security to conduct parallel studies in the UK and Australia [4, 30] to ascertain the 
type of work security practitioners undertook and the skills that are needed to 
undertake that work. From both studies, it was discovered that engagement, and 
specifically, relationship building and communication, formed the core of a security 
practitioner’s everyday work. It was also discovered that security practitioners wanted 
new ways of engaging with communities together with clear, evidence-based advice 
on which engagement methods should be used and when. When the term 
“community” is used in this context the focus is on groups of people bound together 
by common characteristics and goals within an organisation. The studies showed that 
successful engagement is key for a security practitioner because the quality of the 
working relationship between security and the organization is an important factor in 
ensuring the effectiveness of cyber security processes.  
From both studies it was concluded that information security practitioners often 
come from an IT background that ill-prepares them for the relationship building, 
management and communication skills that are needed in real-world security 
management. In the video summary of the research that forms part of [30], the need to 
acquire communication skills and capabilities for understanding the cultural 
implications of technological security is clearly identified.  The complexity and 
highly situated nature of what constitutes information security is highlighted by the 
diffuse definitions of information security highlighted in the Australian study [4]. The 
research in [30] articulates the complexity of the organizational setting and the need 
to navigate and make connections between different aspects of the organization in 
order to understand the relationships between cyber security technology and the 
organizational environment. The responses of participants articulated in [4, 30] 
highlight the centrality of the risk concept in security practice and, yet, how this 
concept has to hold multiple interpretations of what constitutes the protection of 
information and technology and how to achieve it.   
As both studies show, security practitioners have to develop and maintain specific 
skills and knowledge beyond the technical, including: 
• Skills 
o Communication  
o Conflict identification and management 
o Relationship building and management  
• Knowledge 
o Understanding of social, organizational and political as well as 
technical risk signposts 
o Understanding of the relationship between information security 
and organizational well-being 
 
This list indicates that to develop good navigators, we need to educate and train 
security practitioners with good communication skills in order to convince 
organizations to take and remain on a particular path, strong conflict identification 
and management skills to keep the organization on course when different 
communities want to take different risk directions and effective relationship building 
and management skills keep the organization on the same path, moving in the same 
direction towards a common risk outcome. These skills, however, are not enough on 
their own and a wider understanding and appreciation of the world in which an 
organization operates is necessary. This requires security practitioners to be educated 
with a theoretical understanding of the security relationships between social, 
organizational, political and technical aspects of an organization so that security 
practitioners are not only able to read the risk signposts but to understand the 
relationships between those signposts. Education of students of information security, 
therefore, needs to take a broader perspective and a more constructive approach. 
Whilst it is essential for students to obtain core technical knowledge that enables them 
to identify, prevent and respond to technical attacks, they must also develop the skills 
and the confidence to navigate an organization through that complexity when 
anticipating and responding to attacks on their digital infrastructure. 
2.5 TREsPASS and the Navigation Metaphor 
To address the difficulty in assessing and identifying the risks associated with the 
interaction between people and technology, known as socio-technical security, the 
European Technology-supported Risk Estimation by Predictive Assessment of Socio-
technical Security (TREsPASS) [31] was established. The project aimed to improve 
the resilience of businesses and create a standardized framework analyzing the socio-
technical aspects of security. The project [31, 32] developed methods and tools to 
analyze and visualize information security risks in dynamic organizations, as well as 
possible countermeasures in response to so-called social engineering attacks where 
human behaviour as well as technical weaknesses are targeted by attackers. As the 
project description [31] identifies, examples include StuxNet, in which infected USB 
sticks were used to sabotage nuclear plants, and the DigiNotar attack, in which fake 
digital certificates were used to spy on website traffic. New attacks cleverly exploit 
multiple organizational vulnerabilities, involving physical security and human 
behaviour.  
The navigation metaphor was central to the TREsPASS project [31]. The tools and 
technologies developed through TREsPASS research [47, 31, 32] were built on the 
philosophy that security practitioners need to make rapid decisions regarding which 
attacks to block, as both infrastructure and attacker knowledge change rapidly. Being 
able to visualize the risk trajectory [47, 32] was regarded as central to these 
capabilities as the researchers believed that attack opportunities will be identified and 
prevented only if people can envisage them. In today's dynamic attack landscape, this 
process is too slow and exceeds the limits of human imaginative capability. The 
project objectified its navigation metaphor with the development of an Attack 
Navigator tool to help security practitioners’ model which attack opportunities are 
possible and most pressing, and which countermeasures are most effective.   
The project also produced an Attack Navigator Map [47] to help the security 
practitioner navigate the intended risk trajectory calculation by the Attack Navigator. 
The Attack Navigator Map presented visualizations that combine information 
visualizations with techniques from critical cartography and digital humanities to 
articulate different socio-technical dimensions of risk and provide tools through 
which to explore these dimensions. 
The TREsPASS visualization strategy drew on three types of visualization [32, 
46]:  
 
• Artistic visualizations, which foreground the social, cultural, economic and 
political dimensions to security risks and critique security and risk logics; 
• Journalistic visualizations, which situate risks and the data flows within an 
organization and examine the relationships between those risk pictures 
and the workings of a risk model; and 
• Scientific visualizations, which contribute to the quantification of the 
qualitative risk data, articulate the attack and defence interaction (for 
which attack-defence trees are our start point) and enable the user to 
calculate risk from different perspectives and perform root cause analysis 
on risks to complex information flows.  
 
Using the TREsPASS tools and techniques, a paper prototype kit was used within 
two tertiary education programs. The activity provided a hands-on example exploring 
the physical, digital and social aspects of risk. It promoted the application of risk 
analysis concepts to a use case. It was not made clear to the students, intentionally, 
that the basis for the activity was mapping risk analysis approach to the construction 
of a real-world space. This was only explained to the student after they have 
undertaken the activity and was part of the post activity whole-class discussion. 
2.6 Educational Theory and Methods 
Paper prototyping, an output of the TREsPASS [31] research (work package 4 –
visualization and tools), was used to inform and enhance education of tertiary students 
on the construction of security and assessment of risk. This provides an example of 
the practical application of security visualization. It further contributes to meeting the 
outcomes of the undergraduate and postgraduate topics (CSI2102 and CSI5133) 
Information Security, parts of the Bachelor of Science (Cyber Security), Bachelor of 
Science (Security), and Master of Cyber Security, at Edith Cowan University, 
Western Australia. The academic outcomes that this activity in assessing and 
managing risk contributes to include: 
 
1. Describe and apply concepts, principles and techniques relating to the 
security of information; 
2. Describe the role of risk analysis and contingency planning in information 
security; and 
3. Describe and apply classification systems for information. 
 
Education at the tertiary level in information security has not diverged from the 
traditional university education model. Whilst there have been attempts at innovative 
initiatives such as involving students in cyber defense competitions and workflow 
technology [33, 34] these are not part of the main stream university teaching. There is 
little doubt that active learning techniques increase student engagement and the use of 
case studies has been a common method to enact this in information security [35]. 
However, as articulated in the industry reports, and demonstrated by the increasing 
emphasis on job readiness using Work Integrated Learning, what is still lacking is the 
ability of graduates to demonstrate real-world application, in place of experience. The 
need for students to study and experience complicated information security scenarios, 
and practice analytical skills is clear.  
Paper prototyping has been used successfully as a design methodology for assisting 
software designers to simulate realistic experience with multiple dimensions [36, 37]. 
These methods allow identification of real-world issues and provide insights into the 
environment under study. The application of this method to security education is a 
novel and innovative approach to learning. It provides a user-centred approach to 
physical and information architectures and provides the ability to visualize and 
manoeuvre artefacts representing real situations. Further, if the paper prototyping 
method include colour coding and physical construction, a multi-method approach, 
then greater immersion in the task and improved engagement can be achieved [38]. 
This can provide the learner with experience of situational construction and 
subsequent analysis, which is vitally important in learning about information security 
and risk. 
It is recognized that the use of visualization methods to assess students in both 
recognizing security risk and relating this to a specific organizational environment is 
important in developing an understanding of how being technical and social aspects 
of risk assessment integrate and impact one another [39]. Based upon General 
Principle 1. Awareness, skills and empowerments which states that “all stakeholders 
should understand digital security risk and how to manage it” [39, p.9], it is pivotal  
or students to gain multiple perspectives on how this can be achieved, starting with 
how they can construct this for themselves. The development of a solid understanding 
of digital security risk resulting from the interplay of technology, social factors, 
physical environment, and organizational process, is vital to the effective 
management of security in dynamic real-world environments.  Further, that effective 
security requires risk assessment that acknowledges the highly complex and 
interconnected nature of organisation and information systems [40].  
The practice of analytical skills to solve complex problems uses cognitive load 
theory [41] where the short-term memory is not overloaded in favour of developing 
longer-term learning skills. Paper prototyping purposefully provides a visual stimulus 
rather than relying on memory to manipulate an environment and formulate a solution 
to a complex problem. This approach uses constructivism learning theory with an 
instructional design to construct knowledge and meaning from the experience of the 
prototyping activity. It achieves this using a real-world team simulation thus 
promoting learning through communication in a safe and supported learning 
environment. This joint and shared learning experience promotes discussion and 
negotiation of the task.  
Consequently, this approach aligns with cognitive load theory [42] in which the 
learner is encouraged to optimize intellectual performance. The security concepts 
used in the prototyping activity are not new to the student in the courses in which the 
activity was undertaken, and therefore short-term memory overload is minimized. 
This allows the student to think critically about the task. However, it is acknowledged 
that there may be some students for whom this method presents limitations where 
they have not acquired the necessary knowledge prior to the activity. The activity uses 
a generalized schematic knowledge structure to apply to situational analysis and 
problem solving, making the skills learned transferable to other problems [43]. 
3   Method 
Three different cohorts of students undertook the paper prototyping activity. In each 
case the students were given a modelling objective: namely to model the security risks 
to a sensitive data (in this example exam papers) stored on a server. The students are 
asked to consider the following when undertaking the activity: 
Table 1.  Activity guidance  
 Consideration/activity construction objective  
1 Considering the security disposition of the physical and digital space 
2 Identifying the assets and actors 
3 Analyzing the security strengths and weaknesses of the assets and 
actors 
4 Producing measures of risk for the threat of unauthorized access 
mark 
 
This scenario was developed and used because it was a scenario that would be 
familiar to all students. As a project, TREsPASS worked with several scenarios 
including the security of ATMs, security of micropayments through IPTV and the 
installation of malware on memory sticks [32]. Preparation for activity incorporated: 
1. Pre-preparing packs of resources for each student group  
2. Direction to students regarding readings, lecture, and activity. 
3.1 Structure of the Modelling Session 
The students were presented with an activity pack containing: a paper prototyping kit 
and written instructions that replicated the information presented to them by the 
activity’s facilitator. To assess whether the activity can be run independently of the 
creators of the activity, a different facilitator was used each time the modelling 
activity was run. Following a lecture on risk assessment, the activity was undertaken 
in class, with an allocated time of 1.5 hours. The facilitator presented the scenario, 




The students split into groups of between 4-6 participants. Each group was asked to 
assign the following roles to group members: 
 
• Scribe – notes down the actions of the group. 
• Observer – observes the group and checks at the end of the session with the 
scribe’s notes to see if more needs to be added. 
• Map constructor – assembles the completed elements as they are made by the 
group members 
• Asset constructor – assembles the asset elements identifying the security 
strengths and weaknesses of the asset 
• Actor constructor – assembles the actor elements identifying the security 
strengths and weaknesses of the actor (don’t forget that attackers are 
actors)  
• Risk constructor – assembles a summary of the risks resulting from the 
analysis 
• All – contribute to the discussion about the values at work. 
 
The following scenario was presented to the groups: 
A physical server is used to store sensitive student material, in particular the exam 
papers for each module. The server is located in the university, in a server room that 
is protected physically and digitally (via a firewall and host-based security features). 
The sysadmin employed by the university has full access to the server, two 
operational administrators have access to the server but not to the exam papers and 
the module leader has access to the exam papers but not to the underlying operating 
system. Both the sysadmin and the module leader can edit the exam papers using 
remote access protocols as well as by locally logging on to the server. The server is 
logically separated from the rest of the university network (protected by routers and 
an internal firewall).  
 
The following areas of analysis were outlined: 
Please explore the threat of unauthorized access to the exam papers by: 
• Considering the security disposition of the physical and digital space; 
• Identifying the assets and actors; 
• Analyzing the security strengths and weaknesses of the assets and actors; and 
• Producing measures of risk for the threat of unauthorized access to the exam 
papers. 
Students were given 1 hour to complete the activities. Whole-class discussion took 
place for 30 minutes following the completion of the hour. During the hour taken to 
complete the tasks, groups could ask questions of the facilitator and lecturing staff. 
The paper prototyping kit contained lengths of assorted colours that were used to 
represent physical, digital, organizational and social boundaries. The thickness of the 
line represented the strength of the boundary from attack. The pack also contained 
hexagons that were used to represent assets and actors (fig 1). These assets could be 
decorated in different ways to represent asset qualities (fig 2). In addition, assets were 









Fig 2. Hexagon to represent assets and their strength 
The activity was completed three times over 18 months with information security 
students on equivalent programs. In each session, data was gathered through 
photographs taken during the sessions and through annotation of group and whole-
class discussions. In addition, reflection feedback was gathered from students at the 
end of the course and feedback was gathered from lecturers. For this type of activity, 
there is no model answer as the study is focused on the nature of the process of 
navigating rather than the results arrived at. Similarly, the analysis focuses on the 
process rather than the results produced by each student group, although examples of 
student solutions are provided in Section 4. 
4   Results 
The student model constructions were analyzed and the results presented in this 
section. The reflections from students of their learning and from the facilitators is 
integrated into the discussion section as this relates directly to the synthesis and 
interpretation of the results. Analysis of the photographs of the group results, together 
with discussion with the groups during the activity revealed the following general 
observations: 
• Of the four activities the groups were guided to consider (Table 1), analysis 
of the strength and weakness of assets and actors (item 3) using the 
specified activity method was overlooked or not considered as important 
as identification of the factors and how they interacted. The mapping of 
the strengths and weaknesses using the kite diagram (using up to six 
parameters) was not undertaken by most of the groups. 
• The modelling of the assets and actors was well understood (item 2).  
• The concept of using height of the colouring to reflect the magnitude of the 
vulnerability was not embraced or explored by any group. 
• The delineation between the physical and digital space was well understood 
by the end of the activity, although some students has difficulty 
conceptualizing and representing the difference between the physical and 
digital assets (item 1). For instance, where a server holds the data to be 
protected.  
These observations highlight the limitations of the students in discerning the 
strength of association between threats. Much of this type of knowledge is learned 
from experience. As the lecturer feedback demonstrates (given in the discussion), 
activities such as the mapping exercise are an important means to enable students to 
consider information security as a multidimensional problem within the class room 
environment. 
4.1 Describing the Physical Space 
Students were asked to build a frame to represent the server room in the scenario, to 
consider the security features of the physical space and to use colour and line 
thickness to reflect the strength of the space. 
Fig. 3. Example of student model construction 
 
As Figs. 3 and 4 show, the activity was successful in enabling students to consider 
the interplay between digital (denoted by pink) and physical space (denoted by blue).   
4.2 Differentiating Between Physical, Social, Organizational and Digital 
Characteristics 
The activity guidance encouraged students to differentiate between the physical 
strengths, social strengths, organizational strengths and digital strengths of the server 
room and indicate these differentiations using colour. By examining the relative 
strengths of the different dimensions, the students were encouraged to think about 
how the different strengths complemented each other and how you might combine 
these strengths. As Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show, students were able to differentiate between 
the physical and digital strengths of a space but found it hard to bring in the third and 
fourth dimensions, social and organizational strengths, indicating that this is an area 
that would benefit from future focus during lectures and seminars.  
Fig. 4. Example of student model construction 
5   Discussion  
5.1 Reflection from Students 
Students were highly engaged both in the task – particularly in understanding the 
parameters of the activity and construction of the use case, and in group discussion 
negotiating what risks were present, the strength of these risks, and how to calculate 
the magnitude of any risks present (Table 1, item 4). Further, the activity promoted 
the interpersonal communication required and team work to build consensus within 
the group. The prototyping activity presents multifaceted learning through personal 
understanding enhanced by team communication and demonstration through 
modeling. This method aligns to good cognitive load theory and indeed, Kirschner et 
al. [44] affirm that groups working on complex problems can spread ‘working-
memory’ across the group thus allowing for enhanced critical constructions.  
There were differences, as may be expected, between the function of the 
postgraduate and undergraduate groups. The postgraduate students took longer to start 
the construction of the environment using the materials provided – initial discussion 
was heavily focused on understanding the use case and getting the solution ‘right’. In 
some ways these students were less adventurous in exploring the activity, with an 
expectation of providing an ideal answer. This group was more focused on 
engineering a solution rather than exploring the environment and adapting their 
responses as they learned more about the environment.  
By contrast, many of the undergraduate groups were less concerned with a correct 
answer, rather focusing on the construction and integration of the elements of the task. 
In this undergraduate cohort, participants were more willing to combine dimensions 
of the space they were modelling to develop ways of both understanding and 
mitigating the risks they were asked to investigate. They reacted to the model in a 
more intuitive way and examined how the risks were shaped by the environment.  
There was therefore a notable difference between the groups who actively started 
with construction and were comfortable to adapt and change as their understanding of 
the task changed, and those groups who ‘needed’ to fully understand all elements 
before beginning any construction, resulting in them taking longer to understand what 
they were to achieve and how to go about this. In the former group, there was more 
evidence of navigation skills, a different type of communication and a more holistic 
understanding of the system security. It is also noteworthy that the postgraduate 
groups had a more engineering, solution-oriented approach, an approach potentially 
learned in undergraduate classes and security practitioner experiences. 
The activity provided an alternative method for learning and apply the concepts 
using visualization. Research demonstrates that “student perceptions of visualization” 
result in the usefulness of it as a method to address complex issues [45], and in this 
experience students appreciated the method to enhance their learning. Student 
comments from the Edith Cowan University – Unit Teaching and Evaluation 
Instrument indicate that the class activities, including this activity, helped their 
learning: 
• “I found the lecture activities to be the best aspect- I was skeptical at first, 
but really enjoyed them”  
• “Each and every lecture followed by a real-life situation”  
• “Being able to utilize real-world scenarios” 
• “Out of the box activities” 
5.2 Reflection from Facilitators.  
“The approach of using a visual representation really “turned the lights on” of the 
students. The interaction and cooperation of the group was very helpful to the topic, 
but also for me. I have been trying to get more openness and interaction happening 
between the students and this was a great way of doing this”.  
And 
“The staged breakdown into “chewable” chunks also allowed for the students to 
complete a relatively complex task in a logical and methodical manner which takes 
away the perceived enormity of the task. That said…. For those that went through the 
process the feedback to me in the tutorial was that when you really drill down its can 
be quite a complex and thorough exercise, which is what separated a “tick and flick” 
from “proper” risk assessments.”  
The students started to think about how the elements connect in the one 
environment, and this demonstrates a type of wayfinding or navigation. It exposes a 
method of cognitive reasoning using colouring and different icons that reflects 
wayfinding and reveals a progression of conceptual understanding about the space on 
the paper that can be observed as navigating the space under construction.  
5.3 Future Activity Refinements 
Development of the activity into a 3D space, for instance using Lego, might enhance 
the activity for those students who need a more tactile experience and who can better 
identify and make sense of the different aspects of an organization through 
construction and making. The addition of string to indicate links and weak points 
might increase the ability of students to define a richer picture and consider an 
organization in terms of connections and relationships. Whilst consideration of 
inclusion of the threat sources would be beneficial it is also a limitation given the 
timeframe allocated to learning sessions. However, including a mechanism for 
showing physical threats that influence the confidentiality, availability and integrity of 
information would be a useful addition, particularly for threats from an authenticated 
insider, as much of the student focus was from the external perspective. Another 
aspect of complexity that could be added for those with more security experience, or 
as a follow-on activity, might be highlighting how foregrounding different aspects of 
an organization (such as social, cultural, economic or political) re-shapes information 
security risk, and posing the question of how multiple perspectives of risk and 
information security might be responded to within an information security strategy. 
This would further highlight the role of the security practitioner as a navigator 
through increased complexities and nuances of the context under exploration.  
In the exercises trialed, students observed other groups working on the problem 
and the resultant models. In future iterations inclusion of peer presentation of the 
outcomes discovered would be likely to reinforce learning and to promote discussion 
and learning by those outside individual groups.  
From the outcomes observed, the overlay of the three essential aspects of physical 
security, logical security and security perception were problematic for some student 
groups to grasp initially but highlighted to the students the multiple layer and 
perspectives needed to navigate real-world security landscapes. This aspect of the 
exercise might be simplified by practice roles to participants, e.g. an information 
security manager (logical), a CEO (perception) and a physical security manager 
(physical). The results would illustrate the differences in perspective when all aspects 
were bought together. 
6   Conclusion 
The granularity expected to be produced from the construction and analysis appeared 
to be beyond the cognitive ability of some students with the preliminary level of 
knowledge and security experience.  As part of the cutting-edge EU research on the 
quantification of risk, and part of the EU TREsPASS project, the students were 
immersed in concepts designed to prompt thinking as well as make sense of a specific 
real-world example.  The skills and knowledge that such scenarios demand  raise 
the question of whether the traditional risk-based information security practitioner 
approach to security has reached its ‘use by’ date. There is no argument that the 
pervasive nature of computing has created complex and technologically interwoven 
work and home environments, which, in turn, create increasingly challenging 
problems for effective information security. The role of the security practitioner is 
evolving, and the expectations of the skills required shifting from purely risk analysis 
and implementation to that of a person who can see across perspectives and steer a 
path through the complexities of organizations- in other words a navigator.   
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